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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA 
CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. v. LEE: THE 
PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE FALLS TO A 
GOVERNMENT INTENT STANDARD 
STEPHEN K. SCHUTTE* 
The guarantees of the First Amendment should not 
turn entirely on ... the grace of the Government. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, the public forum doctrine has main-
tained a byzantine existence.2 The Supreme Court has struggled 
to define the extent to which the First Amendment3 protects ex-
pressive activities in public places.· Prior to developing a public 
forum doctrine, the Court used various means to limit govern-
ment restrictions of expressive uses of public property. II Since 
* J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 1993. My thanks to· David Day for his 
continuous guidance, to William Buss for our discussions about the public forum doc-
trine, and to Laurilyn Goettsch for reviewing earlier drafts. Thanks also to Mary Rupp 
and the Law Review Senior Editorial Staff at Golden Gate University for their technical 
assistance in preparing this article for publication. 
1. Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 822 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
2. See MICHAEL NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THE-
ORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 4.09[D1, at 70-73 (2d ed. 1984) (describing the arcane 
categorization that takes place in public forum/nonpublic forum adjudication). 
3. The first amendment free speech guarantee reads: "Congress shall make no law 
... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
4. Barbara S. Gaal, Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Ac-
cess to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. REV. 121, 121 (1982). The constitutional 
policy deficiencies surrounding the public forum doctrine have been well documented. 
See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 
VAND. L. REV. 265, 266-70 (1981) (outlining the constitutional defects of public forum 
analysis). Beyond constitutional inadequacies, however, the Court's application of the 
public forum doctrine has been patently inconsistent. JEREMY BARRON & C.T. DIENES, 
HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS 127 (1979) (examining the wavering princi-
ples used in public forum cases). 
5. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 572 (1941) (holding that the first 
amendment protects expressive use of public property from overly broad statutory re-
563 
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1972, however, the Court has increasingly relied on categorical 
approaches to determine when members of the general public 
can use government-controlled property for communicative 
purposes.6 
Under the public forum doctrine, the Court examines the 
character of the property at issue and labels the property as ei-
ther a public forum, a designated forum, or a nonpublic forum. 7 
If property is a public forum, government regulation of speech 
on the property is guided by strict constitutional limitations.8 A 
strictions); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 297 (1940) (rejecting fiat bans of ex-
pression on public property); Hague ,v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 499 (1939) (discussing the 
importance of the free speech guarantee); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 447 
(1938) (discussing the importance of free speech in contrast with government regulations 
of expression); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 
640, 642 (1981) (limiting the government's ability to regulate expression on state fair-
grounds); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 829 (1976) (analyzing restrictions of free speech 
at a military base); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 546 (1975) 
(limiting the government's ability to regulate expression in municipal theatres); Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107 (1972) (denouncing the government's regulation of 
expression on public school grounds); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 134 (1966) (re-
stricting the government's ability to regulate free speech in public libraries). 
6. C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amend-
ment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110-15 (1986); Robert C. Post, Between Gov-
ernance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. 
REV. 1713, 1715-16 (1987); Gaal, supra note 4, at 121. 
Justice Roberts' opinion in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939), is often 
regarded as the origin of the public forum doctrine. The doctrine, however, was rarely 
used until the 1970s. By 1984, "public forum" appeared in only thirty-two Supreme 
Court cases; only two of these cases were decided before 1970, while thirteen were de-
cided in the 1980s. Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public 
Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 1219, 1221-22 (1984). For a detailed analysis of the public forum doctrine's evolu-
tion, see Dienes, supra, and Post, supra. For a more current tracing of the public forum 
doctrine, see David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming March, 1993). 
7. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
8. Post, supra note 6, at 1715. As such, the traditional public forum is considered 
the most speech protective. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (noting 
that the traditional forum, while limited to property having as "a principal purpose ... 
the free exchange of ideas," nevertheless maintained the sanctity of free speech values). 
The traditional public forum doctrine generally means that: 
[T)he government may not prohibit all communicative activ-
ity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must 
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end. The State may also enforce regulations of time, place, 
and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and 
leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 
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designated public forum emerges from a nonpublic forum once 
the government affirmatively designates the property as open to 
speaker access.9 Government regulation of speech in a desig-
nated forum, as in a public forum, receives strict judicial scru-
tiny.lo If property is classified as a nonpublic forum, however, 
Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 45 (citations omitted). 
After classifying a government restriction as pertaining to a public forum, the Court 
further determines whether the restriction is content-based or content-neutral. LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 987 (2d ed. 1988) (distin-
guishing among restrictions focused on communication or communicative impact); Ger-
ald Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-
Matter Restrictions, 46 U: CHI. L. REV. 81, 81 (1978) (discussing conten~-based and con-
tent-neutral terminology). 
Content-based restrictions discriminate against message content, permitting expres-
sion of some messages while prohibiting expression of others. [d. at 81 n.3. The Court. 
employs heightened judicial review when examining content-based restrictions. See 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). Thus, content-based restrictions will be 
upheld only where they serve a compelling state interest and are narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end. [d. at 270 ·(holding that certain state interests may be so compelling 
that, where no adequate alternative exists, a content-based distinction-if narrowly 
drawn-would be a permissible way of furthering those objectives). 
Conversely, content-neutral government regulations generally receive a lower stan-
dard of review than content-based restrictions. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public 
Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) ("A restriction that regulates only the time, 
place, or manner of speech may be imposed so long as it is reasonable. But when the 
regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized 
more carefully .... "). A content-neutral regulation may limit expression irrespective of 
message content and focus on the time, place, or manner of the expression. TRIBE, supra, 
at 992-93; Post, supra note 6, at 1760. For example, in Heffron v. International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981), the Court upheld a regulation making 
it unlawful to distribute literature on state fairgrounds from places other than a public 
booth. [d. at 654. Although the Court found the fairgrounds to be a public forum, it held 
that crowd control and concerns for public safety justified the rule. [d. at 649-54. The 
Court required that the content-neutral regulation need only serve a "significant," rather 
than a compelling, state interest. [d. at 647-48 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). 
Where laws completely ban expression in a public forum, the Court is usually more 
critical than it is in its approach toward content-neutral regulations. TRIBE, supra, at 
992; Gaal, supra note 4, at 126. Indeed, in Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16, the Court, in dicta, 
called for "guaranteed minimum access," where public fora were involved. Gilal, supra 
note 4, at 126. See United States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 
U.S. 114, 128 (1981) (reaffirming the guaranteed minimum access approach in declining 
to designate a letter box as a public forum "to which the First Amendment guarantees 
access to all comers"); Gaal, supra note 4, at 126-27. 
9. G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, U. ILL. L. REV. 
949,956 (1991). 
10. The continuing vitality of the designated forum is questionable. See Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing the Court's current use of a desig-
nated public forum as so constricti~e that it "empties the limited-public-forum concept 
of all its meaning"); see generally Buchanan, supra note 9, at 956-73 (tracing the decline 
of the designated forum). 
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the government is afforded greater latitude in regulating 
speech.ll 
In examining access-related First Amendment issues, the 
Court generally begins by classifying the specific type of forum 
involved in the case.12 The Court then evaluates the government 
regulation, using a standard of review consistent with the classi-
fication. 1s The Court frequently will invalidate regulations of 
speech in traditional and designated fora,14 and sustain regula-
tions of nonpublic fora. 111 The public forum doctrine has histori-
cally protected expressive activity, particularly in public fora, 
which "occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment 
protection."16 Last Term, however, the Supreme Court in Inter-
national Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISK-
CON)17 confirmed that the once speech-protective public forum 
Nonetheless, a designated forum generally means that: 
Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the 
open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound 
by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum. 
Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissi-
ble, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn 
to effectuate a compelling state interest. 
Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 46 (citations omitted). 
11. Great judicial deference is given to governmental regulation of nonpublic fora. 
As the Court has stated: "In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State 
may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as 
the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely 
because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. (citations omitted). See also 
TRIBE, supra note 8, at 992. The Court has stated that "[clontrol over access to a non-
public forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinc-
tions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint 
neutral." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. 
12. Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 739, 739-40 (1991). For example, before asking whether individuals have a right of 
access to a particular property for expressive purposes, the Court asks, "What kind of 
forum is the particular property?" Id. at 740, n5. 
13. Id. at 740. 
14. Id. at 740-41. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
15. Saphire, supra note 12, at 741. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 
(1990) (plurality opinion); Hazlewood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
16. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180. See Saphire, supra note 12, at 741 and n.lO. 
17. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). In ISKCON, the Supreme Court issued three separate 
opinions. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON I), 
112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (discussing the public forum and solicitation issues); Lee v. Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON II), 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) (per 
curiam) (discussing the distribution issue); International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON IIl), 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992) (containing the collective opinions 
of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in response to ISKCON I and ISKCON II). 
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doctrine is now a speech-restrictive method used to sustain gov-
ernmental restrictions of expression. 18 
Because the forum classification dictates the level of judicial 
review applied to government regulation, it is the critical in-
quiry. ISKCON drastically altered the scheme of the public fo-
rum by allowing the government officials to determine the forum 
status of its property, thereby controlling the scope of judicial 
review.19 The primary significance of ISKCON may be in the 
Court's method, rather than the actual result. Throughout the 
evolution of the forum doctrine, the Court asserted a level of 
This article uses ISKCON to refer to all three opinions together. See The Supreme 
Court, 1991 Leading Cases, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 279, 279 n.3 (1992) [hereinafter Leading 
Cases). 
18. See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2716 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(noting that the majority's "analysis is flawed at its very beginning. It leaves the govern-
ment with almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property ... and it leaves 
almost no scope for the development of new public forums absent the rare approval of 
the government."). See also Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doc-
trine and the Return to Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 394-95 (1986) (looking at the 
pro-government effect necessarily produced by the Court's tiered analysis); Farber & No-
wak, supra note 6, at 1234 (discussing the confused application of the doctrine which 
ultimately ignores the people and focuses on the place). 
Beyond the decay of the once-protective public forum doctrine lie the patently in-
consistent decisions rendered by the Court under the rubric of the doctrine itself. Post, 
supra note 6, at 1715. As Professor Post points out: 
Id. 
Although public forum doctrine has developed with extraordi-
nary speed, it has done so in a manner heedless of its constitu-
tional foundations. The Court has yet to articulate a defensi-
ble constitutional justification for its basic project of dividing 
government property into distinct categories, much less for 
the myriad of formal rules governing the regulation of speech 
within these categories . . .. The doctrine has in fact become 
a serious obstacle not only to sensitive First Amendment anal-
ysis, but also to a realistic appreciation of the government's 
requirements in controlling its own property. 
19. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (limiting the historical inquiry under public 
forum analysis, then deciding the forum status of airport terminals based on the govern-
ment's intended purpose for the property); Leading Cases, supra note 17, ct 288-89. ("In 
ISKCON, the Court held that the government can require those who would use any 
government property other than streets, sidewalks, and parks, to forsake First Amend-
ment rights they would otherwise enjoy."). 
The transformation of public forum analysis from concept to doctrine highlights its 
varied use and substantive effect. The public forum concept was once used only as a 
rebuttal to the government's assertion that the particular restriction was merely a time, 
place, or manner regulation. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177. In contrast, the modern public fo-
rum doctrine imposes a threshold which a challenger must surmount with an initial 
burden. 
5
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judicial scrutiny dependent upon the nature of the forum. 2o 
ISKCON, however, completes the process of divorcing public fo-
rum analysis from its historical roots and directs the focus of 
future cases away from a property's traditional use and toward 
the government's intent.21 
Rather than focusing on the nature of the government's reg-
ulation, the Rehnquist Court is swayed by the intent of govern-
ment officials ~ho, in turn, dictate the forum status of public 
property.22 The result has been a formalism that "yield[s] an in-
adequate jurisprudence of labels."23 If government asserts that a 
particular location is intended to be a non public 'forum, judicial 
deference is the result. This deferential position in free speech 
analysis is not the sole concern; rather, the arbitrary nature of 
the standards used to decide a property's forum classification, 
compounded by the Court's strict limitation of traditional public 
fora, poses a direct threat to First Amendment values.24 In that 
regard, ISKCON dramatically reaffirms the Court's use of the 
public forum doctrine as a pro-government approach to regula-
tions affecting expressive activity on publicly-owned property. 
20. Buchanan, supra note 9, at 953; Saphire, supra note 12, at 757. The Court's 
categorical approach may serve as a pretext for reliance on an independent factor. This 
factor, becoming less covert in recent decisions, is the intent of government officials. See 
ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2707 (determining the forum status of airports by noting that 
"the record demonstrates that the [government] considers the purpose of the terminals 
to be the facilitation of passenger air travel, not the promotion of expression"); Dienes, 
supra note 6, at 120 (noting that "the conceptualistic, nonpublic-forum doctrine prede-
termines the judicial answer through the labeling process"). 
21. See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2716 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(stating that "[t]he Court's approach is contrary to the underlying purposes of the public 
forum doctrine"). 
The Court's restriction of free speech using various doctrinal subtleties is not a new 
revelation. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW, 17 (1991); Robin West, Taking Rights 
Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 44-45 (1990) (noting that "[t]he Court's illiberal deci-
sions of the 1989 Term reflect a growing societal consensus that the traditionally liberal 
faith in the individual is somewhat misplaced and that the correlative liberal distrust of 
state and community authority is somewhat overdrawn"); Tom Rowland & Jeremy 
Todd, Where You Sit Depends on Who Sits: Platform Promises and Judicial Gatekeep-
ing in the Federal District Courts, 53 J. POL. 175, 184 (1991). 
22. Traditional free speech doctrine focused on the nature of the government's regu-
lation when dictating a court's standard of review. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 992-93; 
David S. Day; The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491, 492 
(1988). 
23. Dienes, supra note 6, at 110. 
24. Gaal, supra note 4, at 135. 
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II. CASE OUTLINE 
In 1991, petitioner International Society For Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., a nonprofit religious corporation whose mem-
bers solicit funds in public places to support their movement, 
brought suit against the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey.21i The Port Authority owns and operates three major air-
ports in the New York City area.26 To control passenger disrup-
tion and facilitate convenience, the Port Authority adopted reg-
ulations forbidding the repetitive solicitation of money or 
distribution of literature.27 The regulations applied to the inte-
rior areas of airport terminals, but not to the sidewalks within 
the airports.28 In short, the Port Authority sought to restrict free 
speech within the terminals. 
Petitioners brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the regulations de-
prived its members of their First Amendment rights.28 The fed-
eral district court determined that the airport terminals were 
traditional fora and struck down both regulations.30 The Second 
25. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). Petitioner's members perform a ritual called 
sankirtan that involves "going into public places, disseminating religious literature and 
soliciting funds to support the religion." International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc. v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 577 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). The 
named defendant, Walter Lee, was the Superintendent of the Port Authority Police. 
ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2703. 
26. Id. The three a,irports are John F. Kennedy International Airport (Kennedy), La 
Guardia Airport (La Guardia), and Newark International Airport (Newark). Collectively, 
the three airports form one of the world's busiest metropolitan airport complexes, serv-
ing approximately 8% of the United States domestic airline market and more than 50% 
of the trans-Atlantic market. Id. By the close of this decade, these airports are expected. 
to serve at least 110 million passengers annually. Id. 
Id. 
27. Id. at 2704. The Port Authority regulation provided: 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
1. The following conduct is prohibited within the interior ar-
eas of buildings or structures at an air terminal if conducted 
by a person to or with passers-by in a continuous or repetitive 
manner: 
(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but 
not limited to jewelry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and 
clothing. 
(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, 
books or any other printed or written material. 
(c) Solicitation and receipt of funds. 
30. Id. citing International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 721 
7
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Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part.31 Relying on 
United States v. Kokinda,32 the court found that the airport ter-
minals were non public fora. 33 In applying the reasonableness 
standard for a nonpublic forum, the court concluded that the 
ban on solicitation was reasonable, but the ban on distribution 
was not.3' . 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari311 to 
determine the forum status of an airport terminal,36 In three 
separate opinions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit 
Court.37 Reflecting the Court's divisiveness, the opinions ranged 
from Chief Justice Rehnquist's preference for government con-
trol of its property38 to Justice Souter's plea for a return to the 
traditional forum doctrine's protection of expressive activity.39 
The separate opinions dealt with the solicitation and distribu-
tion regulations respectively. Given the nature of the fractured 
Court, this article will examine each regulation independently. 
A. THE SOLICITATION ISSUE 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority on the so-
licitation issue,'o framed the question narrowly: are airport ter-
minals considered public fora?'1 He emphasized that although 
F. Supp. 572, 579 (S.D. N.Y. 1989). In finding the terminals to be public fora, the district 
court applied heightened scrutiny and concluded that the regulation banning solicitation 
failed because it was not narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest. 721 F. 
Supp. at 579, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd in part, 112 S. 
Ct. 2701 (1992). 
In applying "traditional" public forum doctrine, the district court likened the air-
port terminals to quintessential fora: public streets. Id. at 577. Absent any justification 
that the blanket ban on distribution constituted narrow tailoring, the district court 
granted summary judgment against the Port Authority. Id. at 579. 
31. 925 F.2d at 576. 
32. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
33. 925 F.2d at 580-82 (noting that "Kokinda has altered public forum analysis." Id. 
at 580.) .. 
34. Id. at 582. 
35. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 855 (1992). 
36. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2704-05 (1992). 
37. Id. at 2701. See supra note 17. 
38. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2705-06. 
39. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2724 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). . 
40. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined Justice Rehnquist. 
41. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2705. 
8
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solicitation is a form of speech deserving First Amendment pro-
tection,42 "it is well settled that the government need not permit 
all forms of speech on property that it owns and controls."43 Jus-
tice Rehnquist, relying on the forum approach to assess govern-
mental regulations, used a two-step analysis in upholding the 
anti-solicitation regulation. First, the Court must decide whether 
the regulation of free speech in airport terminals takes place on 
traditional, designated, or non public forum property." Second, 
the Court must determine whether the government regulation 
satisfies the level of judicial scrutiny required by the respective 
forum.4!! 
1. The Forum Status of Airports 
Justice Rehnquist, focusing on the property's history and 
purpose, rejected the notion that· airport terminals are tradi-
tional public fora. 46 Although he agreed that the government 
faces a high burden in justifying restrictions relating to property 
that has been "immemorially been held in trust for the use of 
the public,"·7 Justice Rehnquist nevertheless argued that the re-
cent appearance of airport terminals and the brief "tradition of 
airport [solicitation] activity [did] not demonstrate that airports 
have historically been made available for speech activity."48 
42. Id. The Court previously held that solicitation is protected under the rubric of 
the first amendment. See Riley v. National Fed'n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Heffron 
v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Schaumberg 
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
43. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing United Postal Serv. v. Council of Green-
burgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981»; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976». 
44. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2705-06. Traditional public fora are those places that 
have historically been available for public expression. Regulations of public fora receive 
strict judicial review: they must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
Id. Designated fora, whether limited or unlimited in character, are those areas that the 
state has opened to the public for expressive activity. Regulations of these fora also re-
ceive strict judicial scrutiny. Id. Nonpublic fora include all remaining public properties. 
Regulations are subject to rational basis review; they must be reasonable and not 
designed to suppress the speaker's activity based on the speaker's view. Id. See Perry 
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
45. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2708-09 (1992). 
46. Id. at 2706. 
47. Id. The "historical" standard was established by Justice Roberts in Hague v. 
C.l.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939), and was reaffirmed in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 
480-81 (1988) (holding that a residential street was a public forum). 
48. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (citing Hague, 307 U.S. at 515). Petitioners argued 
that certain "transportation nodes," such as rail and bus stations, historically serve as 
locations of free speech activity; thus, airport terminals should fall within the protected 
9
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Once a property fails this historical inquiry, it may acquire 
traditional forum status only when its "principal purpose . . . is 
the free exchange of ideas,"49 as shown by the government "in-
tentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse. "CiO 
2. Deferential Review of Government Regulations Affecting 
Airport Terminals 
Justice Rehnquist looked to the alleged purpose of airports 
to suggest that the goal of these facilities was efficient air travel, 
not the promotion of expressive speech. Cil To him, the commer-
cial nature of airports belie a purpose of "promoting the' free 
exchange of ideas."Ci2 Furthermore, he argued that the Port Au-
thority did not intend to promote free expression in the termi-
nals, nor have terminals been dedicated for that purpose.CiS Jus-
tice Rehnquist concluded that based on tradition and purpose, 
the terminals do not satisfy the standards for public fora. Ci4 
Because the regulation dealt with a nonpublic forum, Jus-
tice Rehnquist then considered whether the regulation was rea-
sonable.CiCi Citing United States v. Kokinda,Ci6 he stated that a 
reasonable regulation "need not be the most reasonable or the 
only reasonable limitation."Ci7 To him, the disruptive nature of 
solicitation causes delay to airport passengers; additionally, the 
"unsavory solicitor" presents risks of duress and fraud. Ci8 Be-
cause airports had legitimate reasons to monitor solicitation ac-
transportation node category. Id. at 2707. Justice Rehnquist rejected this comparison by 
stating that bus and rail stations traditionally have been privately owned and are 
thereby excluded from public forum analysis. Id. Furthermore, he argued that the rele-
vant inquiry is airport terminals, not transportation nodes generally. Id. To Justice 
Rehnquist, when new methods of transportation develop, each must face an individual 
inquiry under forum analysis. Id. In effect, new transportation services will rarely, if 
ever, satisfy the requisite "historical" prong of the traditional public forum. 
49. Id. at 2706 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985». 
50. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802). 
51. Id. at 2707. 
52. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 788). 
53.Id. 
54. Id. at 2708. 
55.Id. 
56. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
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tivity and prevent undue interference with travelers, Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that the Port Authority's anti solicitation 
regulation was reasonable.1I9 
In the companion case to the solicitation issue, Justice 
O'Connor concurred.80 Focusing on the nature of the location, 
she agreed with the majority's conclusion that, given the history 
and purpose of airport terminals, they are not traditional fora. 81 
Because publicly-owned airports might rightfully be closed to all 
except those who have legitimate business there, public access is 
not "inherent in the open nature of the locations;"82 instead, ac-
cess is a "matter of grace by government officials."·83 
In determining the reasonableness of the regulation, Justice 
O'Connor looked to the "surrounding circumstances" of the air-
ports in question.64 She reminded the majority that the issue 
was broader than questioning whether the restrictions on solici-
tation are consistent with preserving efficient air travel;611 rather, 
the regulation must be reasonably related to preserving the 
"multipurpose environment" created by the Port Authority.66 As 
the Court previously upheld antisolicitation regulations on pos-
tal sidewalks and fairgrounds,67 and because airports face the 
same problems with solicitation, Justice O'Connor concluded 
that the anti solicitation regulation at issue was reasonable.68 
Justice Kennedy also concurred in the judgment.69 Although 
he rejected most of the majority's forum analysis,70 arguing that 
59. Id. at 2709. 
60. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2711 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See supra 
note 17. 
61. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2711. 
62: Id. (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)). 
63. Id. (quoting United States v.' Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 743 (1990) (plurality 
opinion)). 
64. Id. at 2712. 
65. Id. at 2713. 
66. Id. The "multipurpose environment" relates to the abundant commercial estab-
lishments within the airport. Id. at 2712-13. 
67. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733-34; Heffron v. International Soc'y For Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 657 (1981). 
68. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2713. 
69. Id. at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
70. Id. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text discussing Justice Kennedy's 
arguments against the Court's strict doctrinal forum approach. 
11
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airport terminals are public fora,71 he nevertheless found the an-
tisolicitation ordinance to be a valid time, place, and manner 
regulation.72 The regulation did not provide a flat ban on solici-
tation; rather, it only prohibited solicitations for immediate re-
ceipt of funds. 78 Since it merely limited the manner of expres-
sion, the regulation passed the Court's standard for speech 
restrictions in the public forum. 74 As solicitation is associated 
with coercive and fraudulent conduct,n Justice Kennedy agreed 
that the Port Authority's content-neutral restriction served a 
significant government interest.76 
Justice Souter dissented from the Court's holding on the so-
licitation issue.77 He agreed with Justice Kennedy that airport 
terminals are public fpra,78 yet argued that the antisolicitation 
regulation was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest.79 Justice Souter believed that the Port Au-
thority's purpose of preventing fraud and coercion was illusory: 
"While a solicitor can be insistent, a pedestrian on the street or 
airport concourse can simply walk away or walk on. "80 Further-
more, he reminded the Court that far more coercive conduct has 
previously been upheld, stating that "[s]peech does not lose its 
71. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2719. 
72. Id. at 2721. Justice Kennedy noted that: 
[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasona-
ble restrictions on time, place, or'manner of protected speech, 
provided the restrictions • are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that 
they leave open ample alternative channels for communication 
of the information.' 
Id. at 2720-21 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting 
Clark v. Committee for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
73. Id. at 2721. 
74.ld. 
75. Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940)). 
76. Id. at 2722. Justice Kennedy concluded that the narrowness of the regulation, 
which applied only to solicitation demanding immediate payment of money, was disposi-
tive. Id. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy believed that the Port Authority's antisolicita-
tion regulation was the least intrusive means of achieving a legitimate government pur-
pose and did not burden any more speech than was reasonably necessary. Id. at 2722-23. 
77. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2724. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was 
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Souter dissented in ISKCON I and 
concurred in the judgment in ISKCON II. See supra note 17. 
78. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2724-25. 
79. Id. at 2725. 
80.ld. 
12
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protected character. . . simply because it may embarrass others 
or coerce them into action."sl Therefore, Justice Souter con-
cluded the coercive conduct at issue in the airport terminals was 
not great enough to justify the ban.s2 
Justice Souter further rejected the Port Authority's intent 
to reduce solicitation-based fraud.ss He noted that since 1981, 
there was not a single report of fraud or misrepresentation by 
the Port Authority.s. This fact, combined with specious at-
tempts to inure fraud to solicitation generally, did not satisfy 
the government's restriction of protected free speech activity. SII 
Justice Souter noted that the antisolicitation regulation elimi-
nates a uniquely powerful means of communication for ISKCON 
and prohibits poorly funded groups from receiving money for 
their causes.ss Focusing on the "practical reality" of the regula-
tion, Justice Souter concluded that it was unconstitutiona}.87 
B. THE DISTRIBUTION ISSUE 
The Court then turned to the issue of the Port Authority's 
regulation banning the distribution of literature. Per curiam, the 
Court held that the ban in the airport terminals was a violation 
of the First Amendment.ss In the companion case, Justice 
O'Connor concurred in the judgment.s9 To her, leafletting does 
81. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982». See 
also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("The claim that 
... expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not re-
move them from the reach of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to in-
fluence respondent's conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally different from 
the function of a newspaper."). 
82. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2726. 
83.Id. 
84.Id. 
85. Id. Beyond the unsubstantiated allegation of fraud in the airport terminals, Jus-
tice Souter argued that "the fact that other governmental bodies have also enacted re-
strictions on solicitation in other places is not evidence of fraudulent conduct." Id. (cita-
tion omitted). 
86. Id. at 2727. 
87.Id. 
88. ISKCON II, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710 (1992) (per curiam). The five person majority 
was a combination of Justice O'Connor's concurrence, Justice Kennedy's concurrence 
(which was joined in part by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter), and Justice Sou-
ter's concurrence (which was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens). See supra note 
17. 
89. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2713 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
13
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not pose the same problems as solicitation; since travelers need 
not stop to receive literature, the problems of congestion are 
minimapo Aside from avoiding littering, there are no intrinsic 
problems caused by leafletting that "would make it naturally in-
compatible with a large, multipurpose forum such as the one at 
issue here."9! 
Justice O'Connor claimed that historically, the distribution 
of leaflets has been protected.92 The Port Authority's argument 
lacked an independent justification to support its antidistribu-
tion ban; instead, it merely focused on the problems created by 
the accompanying solicitation.93 Because the Port Authority 
failed to explain why distribution itself was an inconsistent use 
of the terminals, Justice O'Connor concluded that the regulation 
was unreasonable.9' 
In the same companion case, Justice Kennedy concurred in 
the judgment.911 To him, airports are public fora, and because 
the distribution regulation failed to satisfy the stringent stan-
dards of a public forum, it was unconstitutionaP6 
In response to the majority's forum analysis, Justice Ken-
nedy argued that "[o]ur public forum doctrine ought not to be a 
jurisprudence of categories. . . . The Court's public forum anal-
ysis in this case is inconsistent with the values underlying the 
speech and press clauses of the First Amendment."97 Further-
more, he disagreed with the majority's view that traditional fora 
must have public discourse as their primary purpose; even 
90. [d. at 2713-14. Furthermore, 
[olne need not ponder the contents of a leaflet or pamphlet in 
order mechanically to take it out of someone's hand .... 'The 
distribution of literature does not require that the recipient 
stop in order to receive the message the speaker wishes to con-
vey; instead the recipient is free to read the message at a later 
time.' . 
[d. (quoting Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 452 U.S. 640, 
665 (1981)). 
91. [d. at 2714. 
92. [d. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40 (1976)). 
93. [d. 
94. [d. at 2714-15. 
95. [d. at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter 
joined Justice Kennedy on the antidistribution issue. See supra note 17. 
96. [SKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2715. 
97. [d. 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/5
1993] PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 577 
streets and parks, the "quintessential public forums," would fail 
such a test.98 Justice Kennedy stated that the majority's categor-
ical approach, involving. an historical and intent analysis, pre-
cludes the development of new fora absent the unlikely approval 
by the government.99 The speech-restrictive nature of the mod-
ern forum doctrine ignores what must be the critical inquiry: the 
objective characteristics and uses of the property at issue. loo 
Justice Kennedy then offered a unified test for determining 
a property's forum status. He believed that a "compatibility ap-
. proach" avoids the majority's limiting historical inquiry and rec-
ognizes that new types of publicly-owned property are appropri-
ate fora for expressive activity.lol The majority's public forum 
analysis places the burden on private citizens, whereas the doc-
trine was intended to provide a Constitutional constraint on 
government restrictions. l02 To Justice Kennedy, the historical 
inquiry is but one factor; he argued that the central concern 
should be whether a property's objective characteristics and gov-
ernment-permitted uses suggest that expressive activity would 
be compatible with those uses.103 Therefore, if a given property 
shares physical similarities with more traditional fora, if the gov-
ernment has allowed broad public access thereto, and if expres-
sive activity would not interfere with the uses to which the gov-
ernment has expressly dedicated to the property, that property 
should receive heightened constitutional protection of free 
speech. l04 
Justice Kennedy then applied the facts of ISKCON to the 
compatibility test. 1011 The airport terminals at issue were physi-
98. [d. at 2717. 
99. [d. at 2716. In effect, this would eviscerate any continuing vitality of the desig-
nated forum category. [d. at 2717. 
100. [d. at 2716. 
101. [d. at 2717. 
102: [d. 
103. [d. at 2718. 
104. [d. The latter inquiry-significant interference with a government's express 
dedication of property-must be balanced with expressive activities generally. [d. To do 
otherwise would mandate case-by-case balancing rather than a classification system, 
which would provide little guidance to states regarding their ability to regulate speech. 
[d. Moreover, Justice Kennedy reminded the Court that reasonable time, place, or man-
ner limitations (if available) may avoid the strict doctrinal elimination of some property 
as traditional fora. [d. 
105. [d. at 2719. 
15
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cally similar to public streets in that they are "broad, public 
thoroughfares full of people and lined with stores and other 
commercial activities. "108 Furthermore, he reminded the Court 
that plaintiffs did not seek access to secured areas of the airport, 
but instead sought to distribute literature in openly public ar-
eas.107 Reasonable time, place or manner regulations would allow 
expressive activity compatible with the uses of airports. 108 Be-
cause airport terminals were public fora, the antidistribution 
regulation violated the First Amendment, since it was not nar-
rowly tailored and "[did] not leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication.m09 
Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment on the distribu-
tion issue,l1o agreed with the forum analysis presented by Jus-
tice Kennedy.lll He argued that the designation of a given prop-
erty as a traditional forum "must not merely state a conclusion 
that the· property falls within a static category . . .. [It] must 
represent a conclusion that the property is no different in princi-
ple from such examples ... of property from which the govern-
ment was and is powerless to exclude speech. "112 In somewhat 
more forceful language, Justice Souter warned that if the Court 
continued its rigid adherence to the narrow historical standard 
for traditional forum categorization, "we might as well abandon 
the public forum doctrine altogether."llS Applying Justice Ken-
nedy's compatibility test, Justice Souter found that airport ter-
minals were public fora, and thus concluded that the flat ban on 
distribution was unconstitutional.114 
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. lUi He argued that the 
106. [d. (citing the qistrict court's detailed factual findings at 721 F. Supp. 572, 576-
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
107. [d. Justice Kennedy argued that in 1986, over 78 million passengers visited the 
three airports owned and operated by the Port Authority .. [d. He concluded that the 
great extent of public access "makes it imperative to protect free speech rights there." 
[d. 
108. [d. at 2720. 
109. [d. 




114. [d. at 2724-25. 
115. [SKCON II, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justices 
White. Scalia. and Thomas joined Justice Rehnquist. See supra note 17. 
16
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distribution ban was reasonable because leafletting presents 
risks of congestion and delay in airport terminals similar to 
those risks posed by solicitation.1l6 Although some passengers 
may refuse the proffered material, others will stop and debate 
with the leafletter or accept the pamphlets and discard them on 
the ground, thereby "creating an eyesore, a safety hazard, and 
additional clean-up work for airport staff."l17 Furthermore, 
leafletting may lead to solicitation, leaving "open whether at 
some future date the Port Authority may be able to reimpose a 
complete ban, having developed evidence that enforcement of a 
differential ban is overly burdensome."1l8 
C. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF ISKCON 
Despite the widely disparate opinions in ISKCON, two sig-
nificant priIiciples emerge. First, publicly-owned airport termi-
nals are considered non public fora for First Amendment pur-
poses. Second, and more critically, the test for determining a 
"new" property's forum status is government intent. ISKCON 
reaffirms the Court's transformation of the public forum doc-
trine from a speech-protective methodology to an increasingly 
speech-restrictive, pro-government vehicle. 
ISKCON's significance derives from a minor shift in lan-
guage and an important shift in focus. The ISKCON Court 
sealed traditional public fora to include only streets, sidewalks, 
and parks.1l9 In addition, the Court appeared to further restrain 
the substantive nature of this list, both in its technical analy-
sis120 and in its schematic classification.121 The Court's reasoning 
116. ISKCON II, 112 S. Ct. at 2710. 
117. Id. (citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
816-17 (1984». 
118. Id. 
119. Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 283. The Court adopted this repressive posi-
tion despite earlier cases which suggested that streets, sidewalks, and parks were merely 
an illustrative, and not conclusive, list of traditional fora. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
474, 480 (1988); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974). 
120. When reviewing the standard for determining a traditional forum, the Court 
referred to whether the airport terminals must have expressive activity as the principal 
purpose or merely a principal purpose. Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 283 n.48. The 
Court concluded that airports were not traditional fora because the Port Authority de-
clared "the principal purpose to be ... air travel." ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2707 
(1992) (emphasis added). The Court mistakenly relied on Cornelius to support its deci-
sion, id. at 2706; however, Cornelius referred to "a purpose." Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 
17
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will inevitably affect any new forms of government property, 
which, by definition, will be unable to attain the Court's rigid 
standards of a traditional forum. 122 In sealing the traditional fo-
rum category, the ISKCON Court held that the only way to 
achieve heightened judicial review of a government regulation 
was by the government's affirmative desire to provide open ac-
cess to the property.123 Absent this affirmative act, government 
is free to reasonably regulate expressive activity on publicly-
owned property, except for streets, sidewalks and parks.124 
In the cases that launched the public forum doctrine's ren-
aissance, the Court looked at the nature and effect of a con-
tested regulation. 1211 ISKCON reaffirms that the Court will now 
apply a categorical approach to government regulations restrict-
ing expressive activity. The resulting strict doctrinal line-draw-· 
ing is clearly speech-repressive, and "convert[s] what was once 
an analysis protective of expression into one which grants the 
government authority to restrict speech by fiat. "126 
III. FREE SPEECH AND FORUM CLASSIFICATIONS 
Traditionally, individual free speech interests were consid-
ered fundamental rights.127 Government may only regulate a 
U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (emphasis added). 
121. While the Court claims to safeguard streets, sidewalks, and parks under the 
traditional forum test, the exact meaning of these terms is open to manipulation. See 
Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 283 n.46; see, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 
1859-60 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the streets and sidewalks adjacent to 
polling places were not traditionally used for "assembly and debate" and thus were non-
public fora); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727-28 (1990) (plurality opinion) 
(labeling a sidewalk leading to a post office as a nonpublic forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 
U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (finding streets in a military base to be non public fora). Indeed, 
"[t)he [ISKCON] Court's seal might in fact function as a selectively permeable mem-
brane, through which no new properties can enter but through which pieces of once-
traditional public fora can diffuse out." Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 283 n.46. 
122. Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 283. 
123. ISKCON I, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802). 
124. Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 284. 
125. See supra notes 7-16, 20 and accompanying text. 
126. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
127. See Schneider v. State, .308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (discussing "constitutional lib-
erty" of expression); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) ("Freedom of speech ... 
[is) protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress [and is) among 
the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment from invasion by state action."); Robert B. McKay, The Preference for 
18
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fundamental right when the regulation is narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling government interest.128 Thus, when a case 
involved "protected .speech,"129 traditional free speech doctrine 
focused on the nature of the government regulation and the gov-
ernment's purported justifications for restricting expression.130 
Simply stated, under traditional doctrine, regulations affecting 
free speech interests receive heightened judicial review.13l Con-
versely, the Court's current forum doctrine consistently applies 
only rational basis judicial review to claims involving free speech 
interests.132 
The Court's current forum analysis drastically weakens the 
once speech-protective public forum doctrine. When determin-
ing the standard of review for a contested regulation, the Court 
now focuses on the nature of the location, rather than a tradi-
tional focus on the nature of the regulation.133 This fundamen-
Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1183, 1222 (1959) ("The freedom of the first amendment, 
particularly the freedoms of speech and thought, are so vital to the tradition of the free 
society that their primacy must be recognized in sufficiently varied ways to accommodate 
to the various contexts in which these crucial rights may be challenged."). 
128. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See 
also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,412 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
129. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Protected 
speech generally denotes expressive activity that, under the free speech clause, warrants 
heightened judicial review of governmental regulations. See City of Los Angeles v. Pre-
ferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986). 
130. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410; Day, supra note 6. 
131. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (suggesting that free 
speech interests should be protected against majoritarianism through more than rational 
basis review). See also Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 17 (1971) (arguing against the' free speech doctrine's use of a 
"fundamental rights" rationale, although agreeing that this rationale was the traditional 
basis of the doctrine); Martin Redish, Political Consensus, Constitutional Formulae and 
the Rationale for Judicial Review, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1340, 1349 (1990) (stating that the 
free speech clause is an "extensive enclave of individual liberty protected from govern-
mental invasion"). 
132. See Saphire, supra note 12, at 768; Day, supra note 6. Since 1983, signifying 
the ascent of modern forum doctrine methodology, the Court has concluded in every case 
involving the public forum doctrine that the publicly-owned property was a non public 
forum, warranting only rational basis review. Not surprisingly, free speech challengers 
have yet to win. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1317 (12th ed. 1991); Dienes, 
supra note 6, at 117. 
133. Compare United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725-28 (1990) (pluralityopin-
ion) and Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (using a nature of the location 
analysis) and Farber & Nowak, supra note 6, at 1220 (describing the "geographical ap-
proach") with Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410-13 (1989) (using a nature of the gov-
ernmental regulation analysis) and Day, supra note 22, at 492 and TRIBE, supra note 8, 
at 993 n.41 (describing the nature of the regulation approach). 
19
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tal shift in the Supreme Court's public forum jurisprudence 
merits a review of the doctrine's historical progression. 
A. THE SPEECH-PROTECTIVE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC FORUM 
DOCTRINE 
Historically, the public forum doctrine was highly speech-
protective.ls4 In Schneider v. State,185 for example, Justice Rob-
erts reaffirmed the Court's role in protecting free speech against 
government regulation. ls8 The Schneider Court struck down 
three antipamphletting regulations of. public streets and side-
walks. ls7 Even assuming that the ordinances were adopted for a 
legitimate purpose, the Schneider Court focused on the effect of 
the regulations which "absolutely prohibit [free speech] in the 
streets and, one of [the regulations], in other public places as 
well. ttl3S Despite these content-neutral regulations, the Court ap-
plied heightened judicial review.13s 
Justice Roberts furthered the sanctity of free speech values 
in his famous dictum in the plurality opinion of Hague v. Com-
mittee for Industrial Organization:Ho 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, 
134. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 210 (1986); Recent Developments, 
Free Speech, Post Office Sidewalks and the Public Forum Doctrine-United States v. 
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 315 (1990), 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 633, 634 (1991); Vincent Blasi, 
The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 460 
(1985); Dienes, supra note 6, at 110. 
135. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
136. [d. at 161-64. 
137. [d. at 162. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. at 161 ("[TJhe purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is 
insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street 
from handing literature to one willing to receive it."). See also Werhan, supra note 18, at 
358 & n.105 (noting that heightened scrutiny was appropriate because government re-
stricted free speech in a public place); Day, supra note 6. 
In this regard, Schneider exemplified the speech-protective posture of public forum 
analysis. The Court's use of heightened scrutiny meant that regulations of public places 
were valid only if the government could provide a compelling justification. See Martin v. 
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (striking down a regulation prohibiting people 
from summoning occupants to their doors to distribute circulars); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding a state 
statute prohibiting solicitation of money for religious causes without government author-
ization violated the free exercise clause and due process); Hague v. C.1.0., 307 U.S. 496 
(1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
140. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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they have immemorially been held in trust for the 
use of the public and, time out of mind, have 
been used for purposes of assembly, communicat-
ing thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions. Such use of the streets and pub-
lic places has, from ancient times, been a part of 
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of 
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United 
States to use the streets and parks for communi-
cation of views on national questions may be reg-
ulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but. 
relative, and must be exercised in subordination 
to the general comfort and convenience, and in 
consonance with peace and good order; but it 
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged 
or denied. 141 
583 
Justice Roberts' Hague opinion is generally considered the ori-
gin of a public forum concept.142 Indeed, before Hague, the 
Court did not recognize a free speech right of access to public 
places for expressive activity. 143 
The Court continued its speech-protective posture in Ed-
wards v. South Carolina. 144 In protest against racial segregation, 
two hundred students peacefully marched on statehouse 
grounds.145 After refusing to leave the public sidewalks, the 
protestors were arrested. I.e Justice Stewart, writing for the ma-
jority, argued that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not per-
mit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopu-
lar views. "147 Again, using traditional public forum analysis, the 
Court applied heightened judicial review to a facially neutral 
statute. 148 
Until early 1980, the Court relied, to varying degrees, on the 
public forum doctrine to strictly assess the constitutionality of 
government regulations restricting expressive activity on pub-
141. [d. at 515-16. 
142. Dienes, supra note 6, at 111. 
143. Rather, government was likened to a private property owner having dominion 
and control over that property. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897). 
144. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
145. [d. at 229-32. 
146. [d. at 230. 
147. [d. at 237. 
148. [d. at 237-38. See Day, supra note 6. 
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licly-owned property.I"e However, with its decision in Perry Ed-
ucation Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,UO 
the Court significantly altered the role of this doctrine. 
B. THE TRIPARTITE ApPROACH TO FORUM CLASSIFICATION 
In the 1983 decision of Perry Education, the Court an-
nounced its new categorical approach to forum doctrine analysis 
and used a tripartite framework for reviewing fora: the tradi-
tional forum, the designated forum, and the non public forum. lIH 
Perry Education shifted the Court's inquiry from the nature of 
the government regulation toward the nature of the forum. lII2 As 
a result, the category of the forum determined the level of judi-
cial review. IllS Moreover, this shift in focus made the status de-
termination a threshold factor, instead of a subsequent consid-
eration.III" As Perry Education demonstrates, forum 
classification can be speech-restrictive; here, a viewpoint-based 
regulation was permitted. IIIII 
149. Between 1963 and 1983, the Court's use of public forum analysis was mixed. In 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the Court held the "crucial question is 
whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a 
particular place at a particular time." Id. at 116. Thus, if the speech was not incompati-
ble with the use of the public property, it was protected by the use of heightened judicial 
review. See ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2724 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Less than two years after Grayned, however, the incompatibility approach was re-
placed in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). In Lehman, an election 
candidate challenged a local ordinance that allowed commercial advertising but banned 
political advertising in city-owned transit cars. The plurality held that transit cars were 
not public fora. [d. at 302-04. Instead of applying strict scrutiny to content-based restric-
tions in public fora or intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral, time, place or manner 
restrictions in public fora, the Court simply concluded that the regulations did not apply 
to a public forum; therefore, the regulations only needed to be reasonable. Id. 
By the early 1980s, the Court varied its application of a deferential public forum 
analysis and a speech-protective approach. The two distinct approaches coexisted. See 
Dienes, supra note 6, at 114 (noting the Court's inconsistency in applying the public 
forum doctrine). 
150. 460 U.S. 37 (1983), rev'g Perry Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th 
Cir. 1981). 
151. Id. at 45-46. See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text explaining the effect 
of categorization. 
152. Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 44. 
153. Id. at 53-54. 
154. Id. at 44; Saphire, supra note 12, at 756; TRIBE, supra note 8, at 987. 
155. A cursory review of the facts of Perry Education may prove useful to illustrate 
this point. Prior to a public school union election to determine an exclusive bargaining 
agent, two unions had equal access to internal school mailboxes. 460 U.S. at 39, 44. When 
one union lost the election, the school board denied that union access to the mailboxes. 
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Although Perry Education introduced the new categorical 
approach, the Court failed to delineate when forum analysis ap-
pliedU16 or what standard is used to define a nonpublic forum. U17 
In Cornelius v. NAACP/58 the Court sought to clarify the func-
tion of its public forum doctrine. 
Cornelius, like ISKCON, is significant because the facts in-
volved a "new" forum. Federal government agencies in Washing-
ton, D.C. conducted a single charitable donation campaign 
(CFC), allowing government employees to make contributions to 
the CFC rather than receiving separate donation solicitations 
from participating organizations. lIi9 Donations could be "desig-
nated" for a specific participating charity, or they could be "un-
designated" toward a pool of contributions that would later be, 
divided among the various participating agencies. 160 In 1981, 
regulations governing an organization's CFC eligibility limited 
participation to those agencies providing "direct services," ex-
cluding those organizations regularly engaging in political advo-
cacy, lobbying, or litigation. 161 Excluded groups, like the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, challenged the di-
rect services regulation as content-based discrimination.162 . 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that the 
Id. at 40-41. As the school had a "selective access" policy that allowed other groups 
access to the internal mail system, the union argued that the school mailboxes were a 
"limited public forum;" thus, its exclusion was unconstitutional. Id. at 47. 
The exclusive-access policy, as a viewpoint regulation, would likely have failed with 
requisite strict judicial scrutiny. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. However, the 
Court supplanted traditional analysis with its nature of the forum inquiry and found the 
policy to be valid. Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 47, 53-55. 
As one commentator has noted, although Perry Education raises as many questions 
about the public forum doctrine as it answers, it clearly "determin[edl to preserve undi-
minished the government's freedom to regulate public access to its ... property, even at 
the price of obvious and fundamental doctrinal incoherence." Post, supra note 6, at 1752. 
156. See, e.g., Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984) (deciding an apparent forum issue-regulations concerning a publicly-owned 
park-on other grounds). 
157. See John V. Snyder, Note, Forum Ouer Substance: Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense & Education Fund, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 307, 310 (1985). 
158. 473 U.S. 788 (1985), reu'g and remanding NAACP v. Devine, 727 F.2d 1247 
(1984), aff'g 567 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1983). 
159. Id. at 792. 
160. Id. at 791. 
161. Id. at 792. 
162. Id. 
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CFC was a nonpublic foruml63 and the direct services regulation 
was reasonable.16" In a significantly speech-restrictive step, the 
Cornelius Court concluded that the test for determining a non-
public forum was the government's intent regarding the public 
use of the regulated location.1611 As Justice O'Connor stated, 
"[t]he government [creates] a public forum ... only by inten-
tionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.IIl66 
To ascertain the government's intent, the Court looked "to the 
policy and practice of the government" and "the nature of the 
property and its compatibility with [the restricted] expressive 
activity."167 
Thus, ·in a nontraditional forum, the government may per-
mit speaker access based on subject matter and still preserve the 
non public forum status of the property with regard to excluded 
speakers.16s Consequently, the regulation will be subject to ra-
tional review; that is, it must be reasonable to be declared 
valid.169 In effect, the Cornelius Court reduced the Perry Educa-
tion tripartite forum analysis into two: traditional fora and fora 
controlled by government intent.17o Although Perry Education 
invoked the forum issue as a substantively limiting threshold, 
Cornelius further held that this threshold factor, at least in as-
sessing a nonpublic forum, was premised on the intent of gov-
ernment officials. l7l 
Cornelius is inconsistent with the Court's traditional use of 
heightened judicial scrutiny to check government regulation of 
publicly-owned property.172 The Cornelius Court allowed the 
government to determine the scope of judicial review and, in ef-
163. Id. at 806. 
164. Id. at 812-13. 
165. See id. at 805 (holding that the government must exhibit an "affirmative de-
sire" to open a forum to free speech activities); see als~ Day, supra note 6; Michael J. 
Mellis, Modifications to the Traditional Public Forum Doctrine: United States v. 
Kokinda and Its Aftermath, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167, 171 (1991) (noting the Corne-
lius Court's adoption of the government intent standard for designated public fora). 
166. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
167. Id. 
168. Buchanan, supra note 9, at 954. 
169. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)). 
170. Id. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
171. Id. at 802. See also Day, supra 6. 
172. McKay, supra note 127, at 1191. 
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feet, relegated judicial scrutiny to judicial deference. I73 The cir-
cular reasoning offered by the Court weakened the speech-pro-
tective nature of traditional forum jurisprudence.lH After 
Cornelius, the government intent standard controlled all forum 
properties except traditional fora. In United States v. 
Kokinda,175 traditional forum analysis, the last bastion of free 
speech interests, likewise fell to the government intent standard. 
C. THE SPEECH-RESTRICTIVE MODERN FORUM DOCTRINE 
In a plurality opinion, the Kokinda Court adopted a new 
standard for determining a traditional forum. 176 In Kokinda, two 
volunteers of the National Democratic Policy Committee solic-
ited contributions for their cause on a sidewalk adjacent to a 
post office.177 According to the Court, the volunteers were solicit-
ing on property owned by the post office.176 Despite partaking in 
admittedly "protected" speech,t7s the volunteers were arrested 
for violating an antisolicitation regulation. I80 · 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, concluded that 
the postal sidewalk was a non public forum. I81 Although the 
Court agreed that solicitation was protected speech, it focused 
its inquiry on the nature of the forum at issue.I82 The plurality 
noted that the physical attributes of the property at issue can-
not dictate forum analysis;I83 rather, the dispositive issue in de-
termining whether a sidewalk constitutes a public forum is the 
location and purpose of the sidewalk.I8• Distinguishing a munici-
pal sidewalk from a postal sidewalk, the Court concluded that 
173. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811. 
174. Snyder, supra note 157, at 332. 
175. 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality opinion), reu'g 866 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1989). 
176. [do at 729-30. Since the forum category generally dictates the level of judicial 
scrutiny, any change in the speech-protective nature of traditional forum analysis is 
critical. 
177. [d. at 723. 
178. [d. 
179. [d. at 725. 
180. [do at 724. 
181. [do at 730. 
182. [d. at 725-26, citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
183. [do at 727. The plurality stated that U[pJostal entryways ... may be open to 
the public, but that fact alone does not establish that such areas must be treated as 
traditional public fora under the First Amendment." [do at 729. 
184. [d. at 728-29. 
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the latter was not a traditional public forum. 1811 
The· plurality then focused on the government intent issue. 
Applying the Cornelius test, the Court concluded that despite 
the history of public access to the sidewalk, the government did 
not intend to open the postal sidewalk for expressive pur-
poses.188 In short, it was the government's intent which man-
dated that the internal sidewalk was a non public forum.187 
Kokinda clarified the "history" and "intent" elements of 
the Cornelius standard for determining a traditional forum. The 
plurality agreed that the sidewalk had a history of openness;188 
nevertheless, the government intended to close the publicly-
owned property to the volunteer solicitation activities. In assess-
ing a traditional forum, the Kokinda opinion suggests that the 
government's intent to close a location to expressive activity sur-
mounts the location's history of free speech accessability.189 
In his dissent, Justice Brennan chastised the Court's mod-
ern forum doctrine's categorical approach: 
It is only common sense that a public sidewalk 
adjacent to a public building to which citizens are 
freely admitted is a natural location for speech to 
occur, whether that speech is critical of the gov-
ernment generally, aimed at the particular gov-
ernmental agency housed in the building, or fo-
cused upon issues unrelated to the government. 
No doctrinal pigeonholing, complex formula, or 
multipart test can obscure this evident 
185. See id. at 727 (noting that the "Postal Service's sidewalk is not . . . a 
thoroughfare"). 
186. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730. Thus, even though some expressive activities had 
been tolerated on the postal property, the Court held that" '[tJhe government does not 
create a public forum by ... permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally 
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.' " [d. (quoting and adding emphasis 
to Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802). 
187. [d.; Day, supra note 6. 
188. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730. 
189. See Day, supra note 6. Justice Kennedy warned that in certain circumstances, 
"the Government must permit wider access to the forum than it has otherwise in-
tended." Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 738 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Moreover, 
"[aJs society becomes more insular in character; it becomes essential to protect public 
places where traditional modes of speech and forms of expressive activity take place." [d. 
at 737. 
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conclusion.19o 
Justice Brennan challenged the plurality's use of "architectural 
idiosyncracies,"191 arguing that the reason "why the sidewalk 
was built is not salient."192 Noting Justice O'Connor's previous 
aversion to specific inquiries when classifying a forum, he re-
minded the Court that it was engaging in the same "particular-
ized factual inquiry" that the Court once derided.19s Justice 
Brennan believed that the Court's doctrinal pigeon-holing 
threatened the speech-protective nature of public forum analy-
sis,19' and concluded that the plurality's decision would greatly 
inconvenience proponents of free speech at postal locations, who 
would now be forced to engage in a "farce of the public forum 
doctrine. "196 
Perry Education's categorical approach was not in itself re-
pressive of First Amendment guarantees. When combined with 
the government intent standard of Cornelius and Kokinda, how-
ever, the modern public forum doctrine relegates the determina-
tion of judicial scrutiny to the government, despite the funda-
mental nature of free speech rights.196 Taken together, these 
modern forum decisions add a critical factor to the nature of the 
location analysis: the intent of those government officials who 
regulate the particular location.197 
Furthermore, Kokinda eliminated the presumption of open-
ness which once veiled traditional fora and placed the burden of 
persuasion upon the government.19S Indeed, the Kokinda plural-
190. Id. at 742-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
191. Id. at 745. 
192. Id. at 744. 
193. Id. at 744-45. To further illustrate his point, Justice Brennan quoted from Jus-
tice O'Connor's majority opinion in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988): "'No 
particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public 
streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora.' " 
Id. at 745. 
194. See Day, supra note 6. 
195. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at.763. See also Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: 
An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1137, 1205 (1983) (concluding that 
the modern forum doctrine "simply makes no sense"). 
196. Day, supra note 6. 
197. See Dienes, supra note 6, at 120. 
198. See United States v. Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699, 701 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating the 
"[s]idewalks ... are presumptively public forums"), rev'd, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Dienes, 
supra note 6, at 120; William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum, and the First 
Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REV. 505, 527 (1989). 
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ity started with the assumption that public property was closed 
to the public, except where it was "expressly dedicated ... to 
any expressive activity."199 This burden shifting inevitably re-
strains plaintiffs from successfully challenging a governmental 
regulation of free speech activity.20o 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE FAILURE OF FORUM 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
The Supreme Court's review of government regulations of 
expressive activity varies according to a forum's classification.201 
In effect, the forum category determines the extent to which 
government may regulate expressive activity in that area.202 The 
Court has made this position abundantly clear: 
[T]he Court has adopted a forum analysis as a 
means of determining when the Government's in-
terest in limiting the use of its property to its in-
tended purpose outweighs the interest of those 
wishing to use the property for other purposes. 
Accordingly, the extent to which the Government 
can control access depends on the nature of the 
relevant forum. 203 
The Court's classification system by itself is arguably sufficient; 
indeed, some form of methodological construct is arguably nec-
essary to guide claims of access to public property for expressive 
purposes. If the classification system is applied in an arbitrary 
manner, however, the public forum doctrine runs the risk of ju-
dicial manipulation.204 
199. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730. 
200. See McKay, supra note 127, at 1197-1203 (suggesting that allocation of the 
initial presumption will likely determine results). The Court's shift in burdens may po-
tentially erode the once speech-protective nature of the traditional public forum concept. 
Werhan, supra note 18, at 395 (arguing that against countervailing government interests, 
first amendment interests will "invariably lose"). 
201. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); 
see also Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726-27. 
202. See Buchanan, supra note 9, at 955. 
203. Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
204. Dienes, supra note 6, at 110. 
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A. GOVERNMENT INTENT AND PRESUMPTIONS 
The traditional forum is historically the most speech protec-
tive forum.20~ Examples of such fora include streets, parks, side-
walks, and similar locations traditionally left open to the pub-
lic.206 A location is deemed a traditional forum if, "from time 
immemorial," public access was historically provided.207 To be 
sure, the test for a traditional forum has been largely histori-
cal,208 as opposed to a government intent standard.209 
Although the nature of the forum was significant in. earlier 
public forum analysis, the historical test carried with it a pre-
sumption that the location was open to expressive activity.2l0 
Consequently, the government had the burden to overcome the 
presumption, with mere convenience being an insufficient justifi-
cation.2l1 The standard of review was determined by the nature 
of the government regulation and usually involved heightened 
judicial scrutiny.212 Under strict judicial review, government 
"must show that its [content-selective] regulation is necessary to 
serve a compelling [governmental] interest and that it is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end."213 Furthermore, if government 
applies a content-neutral regulation restricting access to a tradi-
tional forum, it must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels 
205. See supra note 8. 
206. Gaal, supra note 4, at 122. See also Buchanan, supra note 9, at 951 & n.19 
(arguing that this list appears exclusive, in that no case exists in which a Court majority 
has extended the definition or permitted the government to contract the concept to em-
brace less than streets, parks, and sidewalks). 
207. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
208. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry 
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Buchanan, supra note 9, at 951. 
209. See Dienes, supra note 6, at 118-19 (criticizing the Court for introducing the 
threshold government intent factor in first amendment analysis); Post, supra note 6, at 
1758 (warning that a traditional forum cannot be premised upon state intentions, or it 
will be rendered meaningless). 
210. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983); United States v. 
Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699, 701 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Saphire, supra 
note 12, at 741; Recent Developments, supra note 134, at 634-37. 
211. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1988); Board of Airport Comm'rs v. 
Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987). 
212. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 988; Day, supra note 6. 
213. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983), cit-
ing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 
(1988). 
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of communication."214 
The designated forum carried a similar presumption of 
openness;211i however, the test for the forum was largely ahistori-
cal216 and, as Cornelius indicated, guided by government in-
tent.217 Furthermore, selective, content-neutral, regulatory ex-
clusions were allowed. 218 Free speech activities could therefore 
be barred by government officials from designated fora. Method-
010gically' the standard of review for a designated forum should 
mirror that of a traditional forum. 219 Although government does 
not have to maintain the open nature of a designated forum, "as 
long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a 
traditional public forum."22o 
The analysis of a nonpublic forum was similarly ahistori-
cal.22l After Cornelius, the test was government intent.222 The 
non public forum differs from a designated forum because of the 
presumption that public access in a nonpublic forum is legiti-
mately restricted, thereby placing the burden of persuasion on 
the challengers.223 The nonpublic forum classification dictates 
that regulations are reviewed under a reasonableness standard, 
which will generally produce a pro-government result.224 
214. Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 45. See also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482; Grace, 461 U.S. at 
177. 
215. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 
(1981). Further, the government had the burden of overcoming the presumption. See 
Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 573; Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r 
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583 n.6 (1983) (requiring the government to adequately justify 
any burdens imposed). 
216. See Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 45-47. 
217. Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788,802 (1985). See Post, supra note 6, at 1751-
58 (discussing how affirmative acts by the government have created designated fora). 
218. Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 46; Day, supra note 6. 
219. Buchanan, supra note 9, at 953. 
220. Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 46. 
221. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803; Perry Educ., 460 U.S. at 47; Greer v. Spock, 424 
U.S. 828, 838 (1976); Buchanan, supra note 9, at 952-53. 
222. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800-01; Day, supra note 6. 
223. Buss, supra note 198, at 527; Day, supra note 6. 
224. See Buchanan, supra note 9, at 954-55 (stating that under a reasonableness 
standard, government may restrict expressive activity if pursuing a rational interest 
through means rationally related to that interest); Post, supra note 6, at 1764 (criticizing 
the Court's transition in forum analysis as presenting "a blank check for government 
control of public access to the non public forum for communicative purposes"); Saphire, 
supra note 12, at 779 n.168. 
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B. FREE SPEECH AND THE INADEQUACY OF FORUM CLASSIFICATION 
Free speech fosters societal discovery of truth; thus, any re-
pression of free speech potentially hinders the emergence of 
truth, or it may even supplant uncontested truth with dogma.2211 
Regulations of expression may endanger the effective exchange 
of ideas and reduce diversity of communication.226 Furthermore, 
speech restrictions limit the "marketplace of ideas" which fos-
ters competition among truth and falsehood. 227 Government re-
striction of free expression stands inapposite to fundamental no-
tions of self-governance, a problem that is exacerbated when the 
government's desire for regulation is increasingly sanctioned by 
the Court.228 
Although government restriction of expression hinders First 
Amendment goals, control of expressive activity is not beyond 
the reach of the government. First Amendment rights are not 
absolute; rather, they are balanced against varying levels of gov-
ernment interests.229 Broadly speaking, a traditional forum lends 
greater support to First Amendment interests. As a result, the 
Court, fearing the erosion of countervailing government inter-
ests, may be reluctant to declare a public forum,230 and use the 
doctrine's categorical structure "in the only way possible under 
225. Gaal, supra note 4, at 131-32. John Stuart Mill forcefully argued against speech 
restriction because true opinions may ultimately not be considered. JOHN S. MILL, ON 
LIBERTY 64 (John Grey & J. w. Smith eds., 1991). Debate among competing opinions is 
necessary to attain the whole truth-such confrontation ultimately instills conviction in 
·the whole truth. [d. See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
226. Gaal, supra note 4, at 132. 
227. See Gaal, supra note 4, at 133; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
228. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMENT 
88-89 (1948). As Meiklejohn noted: 
[d. at 88. 
No one can deny that the winning of the truth is impor-
tant for the purposes of self-government. But that is 
not our deepest need. Far more essential, if men are to 
be their own rulers, is the demand that whatever truth 
may become available shall be placed at the disposal of 
all the citizens of the community . . . . When a free 
man is voting, it is not enough that the truth is known 
by ... some scholar or administrator or legislator. The 
voters must have it, all of them. 
229. Werhan, supra note 18, at 394-95. 
230. Werhan, supra note 18, at 394; Schauer, supra note 4, at 286-89. 
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that model-it finds that the place is not a public forum."231 
In determining the forum status of particular government-
owned property, the Court generally refers to a single criterion: 
whether the public has traditionally had open access to the fo-
rum for expressive activity.232 The traditional use standard, 
however, is inadequate to determine forum status. Properties 
such as airports, shopping centers, and nuclear power plants 
lack the requisite history of accommodating expression due to 
their relatively recent vintage.233 On the other hand, properties 
long in existence may have only recently developed into loci of 
controversy.234 Moreover, custom or regulations may have re-
strained expression in particular areas, thereby restricting the. 
development of a history of expressive activity.m 
The Court's current traditional use standard ensures that 
modern areas will likely be classified as non public fora; as a re-
sult, regulations of such fora will be subject to rational basis re-
view. The closure of traditional use forums promises that even 
minimal government interests will outweigh free speech inter-
ests.236 As Professor Dienes notes: 
In the past, the "public forum" concept has been 
an important tool in securing access to public 
property for free speech activity. The conversion 
of this concept into a device for denying open and 
equal access provides a case study in how legal 
concepts and doctrines can be manipulated and 
distorted to serve differing objectives . . . . The 
Court's treatment of the concepts of the public 
and non public forums raises fundamental ques-
tions about reliance on conceptualistic, categorical 
approaches in analyzing First Amendment 
problems.237 
231. Werhan, supra note 18, at 395. 
232. Gaal, supra note 4, at 136. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). See 
also supra text accompanying notes 140-41. 
233. Gaal, supra note 4. at 137. 
234. Gaal. supra note 4. at 137 ("For example. until the Vietnam War made the 
draft a highly controversial issue. selective service offices were not perceived as a place 
for protest."). 
235. Gaal. supra note 4. at 137. 
236. Post. supra note 6. at 1764; Dienes. supra note 6. at 117 (concluding that ra-
tional basis review is "essentially no review at all"). 
·237. Dienes. supra note 6. at 110. 
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The relatively minor concern applied to restrictions on expres-
sion in nonpublic fora, coupled with the transition of traditional 
use fora into rational basis review, raises the question of why, in 
the face of a fundamental right, the Court requires only a rea-
sonable explanation for government regulation of public speech. 
V. POST -ISKCON: THE END OF THE PUBLIC FORUM 
DOCTRINE 
The Court's transformation of the public forum doctrine 
into a speech-restrictive tool allows expressive activity to turn 
on the intent of government officials, the very people the doc-
trine was created to police. The Court's modern forum doctrine 
lies in stark contrast with traditional free speech values.238 As 
Justice Kennedy noted: 
Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a juris-
prudence of categories rather than ideas or con-
vert what was once an analysis protective of ex-
pression into one which grants the government 
authority to restrict speech by fiat. I believe that 
the Court's public forum analysis in this case is 
inconsistent with the values underlying . . . the 
First Amendment. 239 
Given the history of the public forum doctrine, Justice Kennedy 
aptly reminded the Court that the modern forum doctrine is no 
longer a check on governmental regulation of publicly-owned 
property. 
The ISKCON majority's analysis appears severely flawed in 
light of the Court's earlier public forum doctrine analysis, given 
the fundamental importance of free speech rights generally. 
Goyernment is "now left with almost unlimited authority to re-
238. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
Professor Saphire, attempting to rationalize a coherent basis for the public forum 
doctrine, suggests that attacks against the doctrine stem from "formalism-bashing." 
Saphire, supra note 12, at 758. Whether a flexible or formalistic approach is better suited 
for forum analysis is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, in its apparent quest 
for some semblance of formalism, the Court has abrogated the very bounds that define 
the structure and content of forum analysis. The Court has rendered a three-tiered anal-
ysis, which alone may have been arguably sufficient, into a single criterion for regulations 
of expression on publicly-owned property: government intent. 
239. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2715. 
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strict speech on its property by doing nothing more than articu-
lating a non-speech-related purpose for the area" being regu-
lated.240 Moreover, the ISKCON holding leaves little hope for 
the development of new fora, absent the "rare approval" of 
government.241 
The First Amendment was designed to limit the govern-· 
ment, not to provide additional means for restricting free 
speech.242 Yet, the ISKCON Court asserts that government may 
restrict speech on its property, "for in almost all cases the criti-
cal step in the Court's analysis is a classification of the property 
that turns on the government's own definition or decision, un-
constrained by an independent duty to respect the speech its 
citizens can voice there."243 As Justice Kennedy noted, "[t]he 
First Amendment is often inconvenient."2H The resulting "ra-
tionality review" of regulations affecting free speech interests "is 
simply a means of articulating judicial deference to governmen-
tal judgment."246 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Today, the validity of laws restricting expression on pub-
licly-owned property depends largely on a court's forum classifi-
cation of that property. The public forum doctrine was histori-
cally speech-protective, and an important tool used to afford 
access to public property for free speech activity.246 The modern 
240. Id. at 2716. 
241. Id. The ISKCON Court has, in effect, closed the door on traditional fora to 
include only public streets, parks, and sidewalks. See supra notes 119-121 and accompa-
nying text. See also Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 283: 
The Court's reasoning, when applied to new forms of govern-
ment property, is self-vindicating: for example, because air-
ports are new phenomena, they cannot constitute traditional 
public fora, and because the Court does not treat airports to-
day as public fora, they can never attain a tradition of being 
public fora from time immemorial. 
(emphasis added). Only seven years earlier, the Supreme Court warned .that if its tradi-
tional forum analysis were harnessed to such torpid classifications alone, the result would 
be "line-drawing of the most arbitrary sort." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544 (1985). 
242. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2716. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 992-93. 
243. ISKCON III, 112 S. Ct. at 2716. 
244. Id. at 2719. 
245. Dienes, supra note 6, at 117. 
246. Id. at 110. 
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forum doctrine, however, dispenses with notions of speech pro-
tection and is relentl~ssly speech-restrictive.247 
The reshaping of the public forum doctrine raises funda-
mental questions about using a categorical approach in analyz-
ing First Amendment issues.248 The government intent stan-
dard utilized in forum analysis suggests that the Court, in 
responding to the problematic nature of classification, has rele-
gated that responsibility to the officials who design the regula-
tions. Challengers now have the burden of rebutting a presump-
tively closed forum. 249 The Court's resolve in ISKCON 
illustrates how increasingly, government regulations are re-
viewed with less than exacting scrutiny. The likelihood of suc-
cessfully challenging such regulations by arguing that govern-
I ment is not nationally pursuing. a legitimate goal is negligible. 2~O 
This article is an attempt to place public forum jurispru-
dence in perspective. In piecemeal fashion, the Court has eroded 
one of the bulwarks against censorial action by government offi-
cials. The public forum doctrine currently depends on the intent 
of the very officials it was designed to constrain.m Until the 
Court recognizes the failings of this approach to public forum 
247. The Court magnifies the government's interest in its use of the modern forum 
doctrine. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728-30 (1990). The Court's methodol-
ogy accelerates the intent of government as a threshold condition in public forum analy-
sis. The unmistakable conclusion is that the government interest will suppress free 
speech interests. Dienes, supra note 6, at 118-21. 
248. Post, supra note 6, at 1720-24. The Court's conversion of this doctrine into a 
device which denies open and equal access to public property illustrates how legal con-
cepts and doctrines can be distorted to serve differing objectives. See West, supra note 
21, at 47-51 (warning that the Court often turns the purpose of a doctrine upside down 
to achieve its own agenda). 
249. See Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 283-84. 
250. See Buchanan, supra note 9, at 980-81. 
251. The paradox seems painfully obvious. As one commentator noted: 
[C)onceptual approaches such as that embodied in the non-
public-forum doctrine simply yield an inadequate jurispru-
dence of labels. In place of careful, candid weighing of compet-
ing free speech and public order values, with meaningful 
deference accorded First Amendment interests, judicial opin-
ions embodying conceptualistic, categorical analyses reflect 
under-the-table definitional balancing. Legal outcomes depend 
on whether the speech is placed in or out of the category, on 
what pigeonhole of law is determined to apply. In the process, 
free speech values tend to be minimized or ignored; govern-
ment interests tend to be emphasized and exaggerated. 
Dienes, supra note 6, at 110. . 
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analysis, government officials will be given a clear signal of sup-
port in regulating expressive activities. 
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